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Article Summary
Ian Hacking (born in 1936, Vancouver, British Columbia) is most well-known for his work in
the philosophy of the natural and social sciences, but his contributions to philosophy are broad,
spanning many areas and traditions. In his detailed case studies of the development of probabilistic
and statistical reasoning, Hacking pioneered the naturalistic approach in the philosophy of science.
Hacking’s research on social constructionism, transient mental illnesses and the looping effect of
the human kinds make use of historical materials to shed light on how developments in the social,
medical, and behavioral sciences have shaped our contemporary conceptions of identity and agency.
Hacking’s other contributions to philosophy include his work on the philosophy of mathematics
(Hacking 2014), philosophy of statistics, philosophy of logic, inductive logic (Hacking 1965; 1979;




1 Naturalism in the philosophy of science
Ian Hacking completed his first degree, a BA in mathematics and physics, at the University of British
Columbia in 1956. He earned his PhD from Cambridge, where he studied under the direction of
Casimir Lewy, a former student of Ludwig Wittgenstein (De Sousa 1992; Vagelli 2014). After
holding various positions both in the US and in Europe, in 1982 he was granted a professorship
at the University of Toronto. In 2001–2006 Hacking became the first anglophone scholar to be
appointed to a permanent chair at Collège de France.
Hacking characterizes himself as Cambridge analytic philosopher and his philosophical method
as conceptual analysis. His way of doing conceptual analysis is, however, non-traditional and it
can be seen to reflect the influence of the two quite different philosophers who Hacking mentions
as having influenced him the most, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Michel Foucault (De Sousa 1992).
Hacking treats concepts not as abstract objects but as words used in their sites, and he is particularly
interested in scientific concepts, because they best represent the knowledge of our day (Hacking 2002,
p.24; Vagelli 2014). Hacking’s approach to studying the sciences falls squarely in the naturalistic
tradition initiated by Thomas Kuhn: In order to understand how scientific concepts function, one
must study the sciences in detail. Accordingly, Hacking’s contributions to the philosophy of science
often arise from historical or contemporary case studies of scientific episodes. These contributions
can, roughly, be divided into two parts. First, Hacking’s work on styles of scientific reasoning
concerns the emergence of new domains of human knowledge. Second, his studies of social
construction and the looping effect of human kinds (i.e. the mutual influence between classificatory
knowledge and the behavior of the people classified) show how scientific research not only represents
its targets but also interacts with them. Particularly in the social and behavioral sciences, research
often reproduces, influences, and even makes up phenomena.
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2 Styles of reasoning
The Emergence of Probability (1975) marked the starting point for a new field of research, history of
probability. Hacking’s striking claim in the book is that our modern notion of probability emerged
circa 1660 in the work of authors such as Pascal, Huygens and Leibniz. Although various practices
and conceptual elements which we now collect under the rubric of probability had existed already in
Renaissance thought, Hacking argues that the conceptual scheme of the time did not have a place for
a notion of probability unifying those distinct elements. However, by extending to other areas of
life concepts and reasoning practices that had originally been applied to uncertainty in gambling, a
quantified notion of knowing by degrees was created. This notion, characterized by an ambiguity
between an aleatory and epistemic interpretation (chance vs. degree of certainty), opened up a
spectrum between (demonstrative) knowledge and (non-demonstrative) opinion, in place of the
Platonic sharp disjunction of the two (Daston 2007). According to Hacking, the modern theories
of probability require a certain conceptual space, a set of conceptual preconditions, which have
remained quite stable from the late 17th century to the present. Hacking (1975, Ch 19) also argues
that the Humean problem of induction is a product of the same era: the problem could only appear
after the transformations required by the emergence of the concept of probability had taken place.
The Taming of Chance (1990) tracks the subsequent stages of the development of probabilistic
and statistical reasoning. It shows how the idea of chance transformed from a “superstition of the
vulgar” to a foundational part of our conception of both the natural and social world. Laplacian
determinism gave way to the possibility of autonomous and explanatory statistical laws about
phenomena. Hacking argues that such conceptual shifts occurred in tandem with changing material
practices. The 19th-century “avalanche of numbers” about births, deaths, sickness, deviance and
suicide collected by the new nation states as well as the emerging social sciences functioned as
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a precondition for the detection of population-level regularities in human behavior and for the
development of statistical inference methods. Somewhat paradoxically, the indeterminism of chancy
phenomena, when tamed under statistical laws, made higher levels of control possible (Hacking
1990, Ch 1).
Hacking’s historical inquiries are motivated by the attempt to understand the present. They
show that our concepts and reasoning, although often seemingly inevitable, have a history. Hacking
characterizes probability and statistics as “styles of reasoning”, as “ways of finding out” (Hacking
1982; 1992; 2012). Following the historian C.A. Crombie (1994), he suggests that the history
of Western science has been characterized by a small number of distinct styles: the method of
postulation exemplified by the Greek mathematicians, early modern introduction of systematic
experimentation, hypothetical modeling, probability, taxonomy, and historico-genetic explanation.
Each style comes with a new domain of objects, new kinds of evidence, propositions, laws and
modalities, and ways of classifying and explaining phenomena (Hacking 1992). Although many
everyday propositions (“my skin is warm”) make sense regardless of any style, the propositions that
do belong to a style become candidates for being true-or-false only after we have ways to reason
about them. This gives styles of reasoning a self-authenticating character. They are autonomous in
the sense that they do not answer to a standard of truth beyond themselves (Hacking 2012). This does
not imply subjectivism, however: whereas a style makes a proposition up for grabs as true-or-false,
it is the world that determines its truth value.
Representing and Intervening (1983), although written as a textbook in the philosophy of science,
brings into focus another style critical to modern science, the experimental method. Hacking argues
that experimentation forms an aspect of scientific inquiry which had often been overlooked by
theory-oriented philosophers of science. The well-known slogan “if you can spray them, then they




3 Making up people
In Representing and Intervening, Hacking shows how scientific observation and theoretical descrip-
tion of phenomena are deeply intertwined with the practices of interacting with and intervening on
the world. This new emphasis on the concept of intervention surely helped to legitimize its role in
subsequent philosophical discussions on causation. Furthermore, both natural and social sciences
often create new phenomena. In the medical, behavioral and social sciences, in particular, the ways
of classifying and controlling people associated with a style of reasoning often have consequences
for how people think about themselves, and for the range of possible actions available to them. In The
Social Construction of What (1999), Hacking argues that the vocabulary of social constructionism
often does not provide a useful perspective on the underlying issues.
At least at times, Hacking seems to think that making up people constitutes a significant difference
between the natural and social sciences. Whereas quarks do not care about how they are described
and classified, new possibilities for human action are created when new descriptions of behavior are
put forward (Hacking 1999, p.108). Again, Hacking utilizes historical case studies to address the
question of how the availability of new scientific descriptions and classifications alter the possible
ways of being a person. The most extended case studies concern the multiple personality disorder
(Rewriting the Soul, 1995) and dissociative fugue (Mad Travelers, 1998). Both are transient mental
illnesses, psychiatric phenomena that appeared in a certain cultural context, became epidemics, and
then all but disappeared. In order to direct attention away from inconclusive general ontological
debates about whether such phenomena should be considered real or not, Hacking (1998) introduces
the metaphor of an ecological niche. In order to thrive, a transient mental illness requires a niche,
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that is, it must be appropriately positioned with respect to four socio-cultural dimensions: medical
taxonomy, cultural polarity, observability, and release. For example, in late 19th-century France,
dissociative fugue was situated as follows: the medical controversy regarding its nature drew public
attention to the disorder; it was morally ambiguous between virtue and vice (tourism and vagrancy);
it was a directly observable phenomenon; and a diagnosis provided a kind of release from social
responsibility that was not available elsewhere in the culture.
Hacking employs the metaphor of ecological niche to introduce more structure to the debates
concerning realism about social phenomena. The metaphor helps to articulate the idea that perfectly
‘real’ phenomena can also be local by depending on a specific set of socio-cultural preconditions.
More generally, Hacking describes his view of the ontology of categories in the human sciences
as dynamical nominalism. Instead of there being a pre-existing category that is merely labeled by
a new classification (realism), or a set of disunified things being collected under a common label
(nominalism), dynamical nominalism states that often categories and classifications emerge hand in
hand, “a kind of person coming into being at the same time as the kind itself was invented” (Hacking
2002b, p.106). This interplay between classifications and people underlies the looping effect of
human kinds (Hacking 1995b; 2007b): people are often aware of the scientific classifications applied
to them (e.g., psychiatric disorders, sexual orientation, genius). Such classifications are typically
morally loaded; they are kinds that people may or may not want to belong to. Furthermore, people
are often bound to describe their experience by using the conceptual resources and classifications
provided to them by (scientific) experts (Hacking 1995a, p.35; 1995b). Consequently, people may
react to classifications by behaving in new ways. The new behavior, in turn, creates a need for
further scientific research on the kind, which may, again, have behavioral effects in the people
classified. Through such a feedback mechanism, the classificatory knowledge and the kind itself are
set into motion. Human kinds (like autism or multiple personality disorder) can be moving targets.
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In Hacking’s view, the possibility of such looping effects distinguishes the interactive kinds in the
human sciences from the indifferent kinds often studied by the natural sciences (Hacking 2007a).
Although Hacking’s studies of making up people and the looping effect make use of somewhat
sensational case-examples, their aim is to provide insight into our contemporary ways of thinking
about the human mind, identity, and personhood, and how those conceptions have been molded by
the development of the human sciences (Hacking 2002b, p. 110).
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